Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter B. Lewis, Scott Shalkowski and Stuart Glennan

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


16 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB]
Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]